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THE STANDARD FOR MEASURING THE VALIDITY
OF A FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
THE SHADY GROVE DEBATE BETWEEN
JUSTICES SCALIA AND STEVENS
Allan Ides*
INTRODUCTION

In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,'
alternative interpretations of § 2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act
(REA) 2 were offered by Justices Scalia and Stevens. 3 The focus of this
Article is on that disagreement. Neither alternative enjoyed a majority, 4 adding a new complexity to an already challenging area of the
law. 5 One hopes that a majority of the Court will soon resolve this
intracourt conflict. From a jurisprudential perspective premised on
the text of the REA and precedent, I think Justice Stevens has the
stronger argument. From a policy perspective premised on ease of
application and judicial efficiency, Justice Scalia's alternative is not
unattractive. However, as I explain below, since I think a statutory text
should trump freestanding judicial policymaking-no matter how
attractive that policy may be-I am inclined toward Justice Stevens's
interpretation.
© 2011 Allan Ides. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Many
thanks to Chris May for his enthusiastic support and very helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
1 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
3 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-46 (plurality opinion); id. at 1448-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
4 See id. at 1436 (syllabus).
5 I suppose one could attempt to cobble a majority by reading tea leaves in the
dissent, but such guesswork is a poor alternative to a definitive ruling by the Court.
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The basic background of the Shady Grove decision is simple. New
York law requires insurance companies to pay legitimate insurance
claims within thirty days of receipt of the claim. 6 A failure to comply
with this provision triggers a statutory penalty assessed at two percent
per month of the amount owed. 7 Shady Grove filed an insurance
claim with Allstate, which Allstate eventually paid, but not within the
thirty-day time frame. 8 Allstate refused to pay the statutory penaltyapproximately $500-and Shady Grove sued Allstate to recover that
penalty in a U.S. district court, invoking that court's diversity
jurisdiction. 9

In its suit, Shady Grove alleged that Allstate routinely failed to
tender timely payments on insurance claims.' 0 Consistent with this
allegation, and in seeming accord with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Shady Grove filed the suit under the Class Action Fairness
Act 1 as a class action.' 2 Allstate moved to dismiss, arguing that under
New York law, specifically section 901 (b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Code,' 3 a suit to recover a statutory penalty cannot
be "maintained as a class action." 14 The district court and the court of
appeals agreed with Allstate and ordered the case dismissed. 15 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that whether
a class action was to be maintained was controlled by Rule 23 and not
by New York law. 16

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court held that Rule 23
answered the question in dispute-whether a class action may be
maintained-and that the rule was valid under the standards of the
REA. 17 While the majority of the Court agreed as to why Rule 23 controlled the question in dispute,' 8 there was a disagreement within the

6 N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009).
7 See id.
8 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
9 See id. at 1436-37.
10 See id.
11 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
12 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 140
(2d Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1430.
13 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
14 See Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 140 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (b)).
15 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
16 See id. at 1448.
17 See id. at 1438.
18 See id. at 1436, 1437-42.
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majority-the Scalia/Stevens debate-as to the proper standards to
apply in assessing the validity of a Federal Rule under the REA.19
This Article is divided into six Parts. The first describes Justice
Scalia's interpretation of § 2072(b); the second describes Justice Stevens's interpretation of that Section; the third provides a detailed discussion of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 20 a case that is critical to both
opinions; the fourth examines and evaluates the rationale behind
each interpretation; the fifth discusses the underlying policy arguments behind each interpretation; and the sixth offers concluding
remarks.
I.

JUSTICE SCALIA AND FEDERAL RULE VALIDITY: THE RULE ITSELF

Parts I and 11-A of Justice Scalia's opinion reflect the views of a
five-person majority. 2 1 Part I describes the case and the basic question
presented 22 while Part II-A concludes that Rule 23 answered the
"question in dispute"-in other words, whether a class action may be
maintained.2 3 Part I-A triggered a spirited, four-person dissent
authored by Justice Ginsburg, 24 but that disagreement is not the topic
of this Article. For purposes of this Article, I am assuming the majority was "correct" on this preliminary point.2 5 In Part II-B of his opinion, Justice Scalia explains why Rule 23 is valid under the terms of the
REA and particularly under § 2072(b).26 Three other Justices-the
27
Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor-joined Part 1I-B.
Justice Scalia's Part I-B can be easily misunderstood. Read casually, most of the discussion in that section appears to describe and
endorse a familiar approach to the REA, one that essentially tracks the
statutory language and affirms a strong presumption of Federal Rule
validity. It is not until the last few paragraphs of II-B (where Justice
Scalia disposes of Allstate's as-applied arguments against the validity of
Rule 23) that the exact contours of his model become distinct and less
familiar. 28
19 Compare id. at 1442-48 (plurality opinion), with id. at 1448-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
20 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
21 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436.
22 See id. at 1436-37.
23 See id. at 1437-42.
24 See id. at 1460-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25 In point of fact, I think they were.
26 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442-44 (plurality opinion).
27 See id. at 1436 (majority opinion).
28 See id. at 1444 (plurality opinion).
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The discussion in Part II-B begins with a standard and generalized description of Erie,29 it explains why the unguided Erie choice
has no bearing on the validity of a Federal Rule 30 and then it provides
the following well-established framework:
Congress has undoubted power to supplant state law, and
undoubted power to prescribe rules for the courts it has created, so
long as those rules regulate matters "rationally capable of classification" as procedure. In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized
this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review,
but with the limitation that those rules "shall not abridge, enlarge
31
or modify any substantive right."
Then comes the first hint of a twist. Having invoked the familiar
framework, Justice Scalia focuses on the precise meaning to be attributed to § 2072(b)-REA's abridge-enlarge-modify limitation 32-but
he does not begin with the text of the REA. Rather, he begins with a

quotation from Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.:
[T]he Rule must "really regulat[e] procedure,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's
substantive rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what
the rule itself regulates ....33
On first read, this might seem like a boilerplate REA mantra and
an unremarkable allusion to the irrelevance of "incidental effects
[that] necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules,"
referenced in Hanna v. Plumer.34 But as we will see, it is more than
that. The key sentence in the above block quote turns out to be the
last one: "What matters is what the rule itself regulates."35 The word
"itself' signals, albeit faintly, a distinction between facial challenges
(i.e., the rule itself) and as-applied challenges (i.e., the effect of applying the rule in a particular context). As we will see, under Justice
29 See id. at 1442.
30 See id.
31 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965),
and 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.").
33 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
34 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 445 (1946)).
35 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (first emphasis added).

2011]

THE SHADY GROVE DEBATE

1045

Scalia's version of "really regulates procedure" -a version he believes
to be mandated by Sibbach-only facial challenges are allowed.
Justice Scalia makes this distinction clear when he applies his
standard to Rule 23. Thus, after surveying the small universe of cases
in which the Supreme Court has affirmed the validity of various Federal Rules, 36 Justice Scalia explains why Rule 23 (and other rules of
joinder) are valid under the really-regulates-procedure standard of
the REA:
Such rules neither change plaintiffs' separate entitlements to relief
nor abridge defendants' rights; they alter only how the claims are
processed. For the same reason, Rule 23-at least insofar as it
allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the same
defendants in a class action-falls within § 2072(b)'s authorization.
A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple
parties at once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional
joinder, it leaves the parties' legal rights and duties intact and the
37
rules of decision unchanged.
The focus of this analysis is on the rule itself-in other words, on
what the text of the rule literally provides: a procedure for joinder
that does not alter any substantive right. Thus, Rule 23 literally creates a method for adjudicating multiple claims in a single proceeding
and literally nothing in the text of the rule purports to alter any substantive standard under which the joined claims will be adjudicated.
As such, the rule is rationally capable of being classified as procedural
and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. Thus,
in Justice Scalia's view, the rule "really regulates" procedure. 3
Allstate made two arguments that Rule 23, as applied in the context of the section 901(b) class action proscription, did, in fact, transgress § 2072(b). First, Allstate argued that section 901 (b) created a
"substantive right . . . not to be subjected to aggregated class-action
liability." 39 Justice Scalia rejected this argument out of hand. In his

view, nothing about section 901 (b) -neither its text nor its placement
in the New York procedural code-fairly suggested that the limitation
on class actions was anything but a procedural device. 40 Moreover, he
explained, "the consequence of excluding certain class actions may be to
cap the damages a defendant can face in a single suit, but the law itself
36
37
38
39
130 S.
40

See id. at 1442-43.
Id. at 1443 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 31, Shady Grove,
Ct. 1431 (No. 08-1008)).
See id.
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alters only procedure. ' 41 Second, Allstate argued that even if one
were to construe section 901 (b) as exclusively procedural, the section
was enacted for "'substantive reasons,'" its end being "not to improve
'the conduct of the litigation process itself but to alter 'the outcome
of that process.' "42 Put slightly differently, Allstate argued, in essence,
that section 901 (b) was designed to operate, in practical effect, as an
overall cap on damages and notjust as a cap on the damages that may
be imposed in a single proceeding.
Instead of addressing the merits of Allstate's second argument,
Justice Scalia observed more generally:
The fundamental difficulty with both these arguments is that the
substantive nature of New York's law, or its substantive purpose,
makes no difference. A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some
jurisdictions and invalid in others-or valid in some cases and invalid in others-depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a
state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substan4
tive purposes) . 3
Now his interpretation of § 2072(b) is clear: "it is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of the affected state law that mat44
ters, but the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule."

Under the really-regulates-procedure standard, a Federal Rule's validity is thus measured independently of the particular circumstances to
which it might apply. If, on its face, the rule regulates procedure and
does not abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right, then the rule
is valid regardless of how it might operate vis-a-vis potentially conflicting state law. Thus, a Federal Rule that literally (i.e., textually)
imposed a cap on damages in class actions would violate the REA, but
a Federal Rule that had only the potential (incidental or substantial)
effect of doing so would not, even if that effect was realized in a particular case.
In short, underJustice Scalia's approach, whether a Federal Rule
is valid depends on the text of the rule read in isolation and not, in
any fashion, on a state law with which that rule may conflict. 45 Thus,

"compliance of a Federal Rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed
by consulting the Rule itself, and not its effects in individual
applications."

46

41

Id.

42

Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent, supra note 39, at 24, 26).

43
44

Id. at 1444.
Id.

45
46

See id.
Id.

20111

THE SHADY

GROVE

DEBATE

1047

We will examine Justice Scalia's defense of this test in Part IV. We
now turn to Justice Stevens's interpretation of § 2072(b).
II.

JUSTICE STEVENS AND FEDERAL RULE VALIDITY:
THE RULE AS APPLIED

Justice Stevens's concurrence opens with a general description of
the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins47 and REA landscapes. 48 That general description is essentially in accord with the basic framework
described by Justice Scalia. Specifically, state laws must give way to
valid Federal Rules. The REA-not Erie or the Rules of Decision Act
(RDA)4 9-provides the proper measure of that validity, and under
§ 2072 (b) of the REA a federal rule may not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. 50 The Justices diverge only in their interpretation of this latter requirement.
Justice Stevens's interpretation of § 2072(b) focuses on the text
of the statute and on what he perceives as the congressional mandate
behind that text. In his view, § 2072(b) literally proscribes the application of any Federal Rule that, in the context of a diversity case,
would "abridge, enlarge or modify any" state-created substantive
right. 51 This literal reading would appear to include both facial and
as-applied challenges to a Federal Rule, for the focus is less on the
rule than it is on the threatened substantive right. Read in this allembracing fashion, the REA reflects a congressional "command that
such rules not alter substantive rights." 52 Justice Stevens further
explains, however, that his reading of § 2072(b) "does not mean that
federal rules cannot displace state policy judgments; it means only
that federal rules cannot displace a State's definition of its own rights
or remedies." 53 He continues:
[T]he balance Congress has struck [in the REA] turns, in part, on
the nature of the state law that is being displaced by a federal rule.
And in my view, the application of that balance does not necessarily
turn on whether the state law at issue takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive or procedural. Rather, it turns on
47 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and con-

curring in the judgment).
49

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).

50 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
51 See id.
52 Id. at 1449.
53

Id.
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whether the state law actually is part of a State's framework of sub54
stantive rights or remedies.
There are two key points here. First, the "nature" of a potentially
altered state law is relevant to the § 2072(b) analysis. "Nature" refers
to the distinction between substantive law and procedural law. 5 5 The
§ 2072(b) proscription is addressed only to the former-"any substantive right."56 Second, in determining the nature of the state law, the
operation of that law is more important than the form it takes. Justice
Stevens elaborates on this point in the next paragraph, where he
describes how an ostensibly procedural law could operate substantively. "Such laws, for example, may be seemingly procedural rules
that make it significantly more difficult to bring or to prove a claim,
thus serving to limit the scope of that claim." 57 If that were the case, a
Federal Rule conflicting with the ostensibly procedural, but operation5
ally substantive, state law might well run afoul of § 2072(b) . 8
On both key points, Justice Stevens's approach diverges from that
ofJustice Scalia, for under the latter's approach state law is completely
irrelevant. The only question, from Justice Scalia's perspective, is
whether the Federal Rule itself-on its face and without regard to any
conflicting state law-really regulates procedure. 59 Not surprisingly,
Justice Stevens expressly rejects Justice Scalia's interpretation of
§ 2072(b):
Justice Scalia believes that the sole Enabling Act question is
whether the federal rule "really regulates procedure," which means,
apparently, whether it regulates "the manner and the means by
which the litigants' rights are enforced." I respectfully disagree.
This interpretation of the Enabling Act is consonant with the Act's
first limitation to "general rules of practice and procedure." But it
ignores the second limitation that such rules also "not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right," and in so doing ignores
the balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal
procedure and respect for a State's construction of its own rights
54 Id.
55 See id. at 1457-60.
56 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
57 Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
58 Id. This is much like the approach adopted by Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), describing the irrelevance of "whether a statute
of limitations is deemed a matter of 'procedure' in some sense," where function
supersedes labels. Id. at 108-09. Not surprisingly, Justice Stevens relies on Justice
Frankfurter's realistic insight. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

59 See supra Part I.
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and remedies. It also ignores the separation-of-powers presumption
against judicially created
and federalism presumption that counsel
60
rules displacing state substantive law.
This critique of Justice Scalia is not quite accurate. Justice
Scalia's approach does not eliminate the § 2072(b) proscription altogether; rather, it limits the scope of that proscription to facial challenges. 6 1 Of course, the practical consequence of that interpretive
limitation is that a facially valid Federal Rule may effectively abridge,
enlarge or modify a substantive right as applied without running afoul
of § 2072(b).
Justice Stevens applies his interpretation of § 2072(b) in Part III
of his concurrence. 62 In that discussion, he concedes that while virtually every procedural rule can be argued to have some effect on a
substantive right, that is not the proper measure of validity:
In my view, however, the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one. The mere fact that a state law is designed as a
procedural rule suggests it reflects a judgment about how state
courts ought to operate and not a judgment about the scope of
state-created rights and remedies. And for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs involved in attempting to
discover the true nature of a state procedural rule and allowing
such a rule to operate alongside a federal rule that appears to govern the same question. The mere possibility that a federal rule
would alter a state-created right is not sufficient. There must be
63
little doubt.
Here,Justice Stevens appears to be invoking Hanna's refined outcome determinative test,64 suggesting that there is more of an affinity
between his approach and the "relatively unguided Erie choice" than
he is willing to concede. 65 In any event, Justice Stevens makes it clear
that Federal Rules carry a strong presumption of validity that will not
be overcome by mere speculation as to the possible effects a particular
rule's application may have on the outcome of a case.
Not too surprisingly, Justice Stevens's application of his preferred
REA standard is longer and more complicated than the alternative
60 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
61 See supra Part I.
62 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457-60 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
63 Id. at 1457.
64 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1964).
65 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448, 1449, 1456-57 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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application provided byJustice Scalia. While Justice Scalia's approach
allows him to ignore New York law completely, Justice Stevens must
examine section 901(b) to determine whether that section is, itself,
substantive in the sense that it creates substantive rights or remedies
or whether, despite its ostensibly nonsubstantive form, section 901 (b)
operates substantively in the sense that it is "bound up" with substantive rights or remedies. His conclusion that section 901 (b) is procedural in both form and effect-and, hence, not protected by
§ 2072(b) -requires him to examine the text and legislative history of
section 901(b), the relevance of section 901(b)'s placement in the
New York code of procedure, and what he perceives as the nonsubstantive operation of that section, which does not, in his view, operate
as a statutory cap on damages in actions seeking statutory penalties
under New York law. 6 6 He concludes:
Because Rule 23 governs class certification, the only decision is
whether certifying a class in this diversity case would "abridge,
enlarge or modify" New York's substantive rights or remedies.
Although one can argue that class certification would enlarge New
York's "limited" damages remedy, such arguments rest on extensive
speculation about what the New York Legislature had in mind when
it created § 901 (b). But given that there are two plausible competing narratives, it seems obvious to me that we should respect the
plain textual reading of § 901 (b), a rule in New York's procedural
code about when to certify class actions brought under any source
of law, and respect Congress' decision that Rule 23 governs class
certification in federal courts. In order to displace a federal rule,
there must be more than just a possibility that the state rule is differ67
ent than it appears.
In short, under Justice Stevens's approach, the validity of a Federal Rule is assessed by examining the relationship between that rule
and any potentially applicable state law to the contrary. If that state
law is either substantive in form or operation, the Federal Rule will be
deemed invalid to the extent that it alters substantive rights or remedies embodied or bound up in that state law. In this way, a Federal
Rule might be valid in some states (or cases) and not in others.
III.

SIBBACH V. WILSON &

CO.

Justice Scalia's approach to the REA is premised on his perception of the stare decisis mandate of Sibbach. Indeed, he references this
66
67

Id. at 1457-60.
Id. at 1459-60 (citations omitted).
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mandate several times in his opinion. 68 Of courseJustice Stevens specifically rejects Justice Scalia's interpretation of Sibbach.69 Before
examining Justice Scalia's defense of his position (and Justice Stevens's response to it), it might be helpful to examine Sibbach independently of the Scalia/Stevens debate. Perhaps in this way we can see
the earlier decision as something other than a peg in a contemporary
argument. To that end, I have tried to write a neutral, noninstrumental description of the Sibbach decision, based not on what courts
and commentators have said about it, but on what Sibbach says about
itself.
On November 24, 1937, Hertha Sibbach ("Sibbach") sued Wilson
and Company ("Wilson") in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. 70 Invoking that court's diversity jurisdiction, Sibbach claimed that Wilson was liable to her for injuries she had sustained in an automobile accident that had occurred two months
earlier in Indiana. 71 When Sibbach filed her suit, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had yet to go into effect. 72 Therefore, the procedure

followed by the Illinois federal court was, pursuant to the Conformity
Act 73 and in accord with longstanding practice, the procedural law of
Illinois.7 4 Under Illinois procedural law, state judges were not allowed
to order a plaintiff in a personal injury suit to undergo a physical
examination. 7 5 Hence, a federal district court sitting in Illinois also
lacked the authority to do so. Had the suit instead been filed in Indiana, a state judge, and hence a federal judge sitting in that state,
would have been empowered to order Sibbach to undergo such an
76
examination.
All of the foregoing was perfectly clear until September 16, 1938,
the date on which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
effect. 77 From that date forward, instead of borrowing the procedural

law of the state in which it sat, a federal district court would adhere to
68 See id. at 1442, 1444-45 (plurality opinion).
69 See id. at 1454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
70 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 312 U.S. 1
(1941).
71 See id. at 415.
72 See id. at 416 (stating that the Federal Rules went into effect on September 16,

1938).
73
74

Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1948).
See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARuFFo, AMERICAN CMVL

27 (1993).
75 See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7 & n.3.
76 See HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 74, at 27.
77

See Sibbach, 108 F.2d at 416.

PROCEDURE
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a new, uniform body of procedural rules. 78 Those new rules included
a rule-Rule 35-that expressly vested federal district court judges
with the authority to order a party to undergo a physical examination
' '79
if that party's physical condition was "in controversy.
Because Sibbach's case remained pending on the effective date of
the federal rules, Rule 35 potentially applied to her case, and Wilson
made an appropriate motion under that rule.8 0 The district court
granted Wilson's motion. Sibbach, however, refused to comply with
the court's order.8 1 Accordingly, the district court held her in contempt and ordered her committed until such time as she complied
with the court's discovery order or was otherwise lawfully released
from custody.8 2 Sibbach appealed, challenging the validity of Rule 35,
and the court of sppeals affirmed.8 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to assess the validity of Rule 35 and to address the
relevance of Rule 37, the latter providing the ostensible source for the
8 4
district court's contempt order.
The Sibbach Court began its analysis by referencing six critical
postulates,8 5 all of which remain established principles of federal practice today. First, "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts."8' 6 Second, Congress "may
exercise that power by delegating to [the Supreme Court] authority to
make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the
United States."8 7 Third, the REA, which operates as such a delegation, "was purposely restricted in its operation to matters of pleading
and court practice and procedure."8 8 Fourth, the REA's proviso that
the "court shall not 'abridge, enlarge, nor modify substantive rights,'
in the guise of regulating procedure," was meant to emphasize this
procedure-only restriction.8 9 Fifth, a federal rule promulgated consistently with the above framework repeals the Conformity Act and the
requirement that a federal court follow state procedural law. 90 And
sixth, if an applicable state rule is, in fact, substantive, the RDA
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

See HAzARD & TARUFFO, supra note 74, at 27-28.
FED. R. CIv. P. 35.
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 7.
See Sibbach, 108 F.2d at 416-17.
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 7, 9.
See id. at 9-11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id.at 10.

89

Id.

90

See id.
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requires the federal court (in a diversity case) to adhere to that state
rule. 9 1
In challenging the validity of Rule 35, Sibbach (and her attorney)
faced a dilemma. If Sibbach established that her right to refuse to
submit to a physical examination was premised on substantive law, the
RDA was thought to require the district court to apply the law of Indiana, which recognized no such substantive right. 92 Hence, Sibbach
conceded that the right of a party claiming personal injuries to refuse
to submit to a physical examination was a procedural right. 9 3 She

argued, nonetheless, that the word "substantive" as used in the REA
"translates . . . into 'important'

or 'substantial'

rights";9 4 hence,

according to this argument, the abridge-enlarge-modify limitation of
the REA precluded the federal district court from promulgating a rule
that revised an important or substantial right.95
Sibbach relied on two Supreme Court decisions, Union Pacific
Railway Co. v. Botsfor 9 6 and Camden & Suburban Railway Co. v. Stetson,9 7 to support her position. 9 8 In Botsford, the Court had held, in
1891, that a specific federal statute regulating the taking of evidence
in federal trials effectively stripped federal courts of any independent
or nonstatutory authority to order a party to submit to a physical
examination. 99 In Stetson, on the other hand, the Court held that a
district court was required by the RDA to comply with a state statute
that authorized state courts to order physical examinations in certain
damages actions' 0 0-there being no federal statute to the contrary.10
In addressing these precedents, the Sibbach Court emphasized that
both cases assumed that the underlying right of refusal was procedural, not substantive. 10 2 Moreover, both cases were consistent with the
proposition that a federal court could order such an examination pursuant to a valid federal law: "In the instant case we have a rule which,
91 See id. at 10-11.
92 See id. at 10-11, 13 n.13; see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (describing the application of state law in federal diversity cases).
93 See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11.
94 Id.
95 See id.

96 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
97 177 U.S. 172 (1900).
98
99
100
101
102
Court
RDA.

See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11.
See Botsford, 141 U.S. at 256-57.
See Stetson, 177 U.S. at 177.
See id. at 174.
See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11-13. As to Stetson's reliance on the RDA, the Sibbach
suggested that the appropriate statute was the Conformity Act and not the
See id. at 12-13.
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if within the power delegated to this court, has the force of a federal
statute, and neither the Botsford nor the Stetson case is authority for
ignoring it." 10 3 The key question, then, was whether Rule 35 was valid

as measured by the REA.
In answering this question, the Court expressly rejected Sibbach's
attempt to equate "substantive" with anything that might be recognized as "important" or "substantial.'

0

4

In response to that assertion,

the Court asked, "Recognized where and by whom?" 10 5 The Court
then observed that the given right was "no more important than many
others enjoyed by litigants in District Courts sitting in the several
states, before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered and abolished old rights or privileges and created new ones in connection with
the conduct of litigation.' 1 6 In sum, the Court explained:
If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the
alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse
confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them. That the rules in question
07
are such is admitted.'

Thus, the validity of Rule 35 was easily resolved. Sibbach conceded that both the Federal Rule and the state law with which it conflicted were procedural and made no admissible argument that the
rule-either on its face or as applied-abridged, enlarged, or modified a state-created "substantive right," at least as that phrase was
understood by the Court.10 8 For, in the Court's view, the term "substantive right" did not embrace concededly procedural rights merely
because they might be deemed to be "important" or "substantial." 0 9
Thus, given the "procedural" concessions and Sibbach's default on
§ 2072(b), the rule was plainly valid. 110
The Court ended its opinion by reversing the district court's contempt order as plain error under the express terms of Rule

103 Id. at 13.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 14. Note, again, the emphasis on the procedural nature of the underlying right.
107 Id. (emphasis added).
108 See id. at 13-14.
109 See id. at 14.
110 See id. at 16.
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37(b) (2) (iv), which exempted from punishment as contempt a refusal
to obey an order to submit to a physical examination.1 1 1
IV.

THE SIBBACH MANDATE

A. Justice Scalia and the Sibbach Mandate
In Part II-C of his opinion, Justice Scalia offers "[a] few words in
response to [Justice Stevens's] concurrence." 1 2 He begins by noting
13
that the disagreement between him and Justice Stevens is narrow."
Both agree on the basic REA framework. That framework requires:
first, a determination of whether the federal rule applies and, if so,
whether that rule conflicts with state law, and, second, if the previous
questions are both answered affirmatively, a determination of whether
the federal rule is valid under the REA-specifically under the
4
abridge-enlarge-modify proscription of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).11 AsJustice Scalia explains, he and Justice Stevens disagree only as to how this
latter determination should be made. 1 5 While Justice Scalia would
decide the validity of a federal rule solely by asking whether the rule
itself is procedural (i.e., whether the rule "really regulates procedure")," 6 Justice Stevens would also look to whether "the state law
[the rule] displaces is procedural" 1 7 in order to determine if the limitation of § 2072(b) has been transgressed." 8 Injustice Scalia's view,
the Stevens approach "squarely conflicts with Sibbach, which estab119
lished the rule we apply."
To be clear, Justice Scalia is not saying that he would ignore the
abridge-enlarge-modify limitation, but that in applying this limitation
he would not consult potentially conflicting state law. 120 Oddly
enough, he agrees that his approach "is hard to square with
§ 2072(b)'s terms." 12 1 As he explains it, while one can plausibly determine whether a particular Federal Rule enlarges federal rights with111 See id.
112 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444
(2010) (plurality opinion). It is something of a curiosity thatJustice Sotomayor, who
joined Part II-B of Scalia's opinion, did not join this section of the opinion, which is,
in essence, the defense of Part 1I-B.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 Id.
118 See id. at 1444-45.
119 Id. at 1445.
120 See id. at 1445-46.
121 Id. at 1446.
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out reference to state law, "it is hard to understand how it can be
determined whether a Federal Rule 'abridges' or 'modifies' substantive rights without knowing what state-created rights would obtain if
the Federal Rule did not exist."122 Yet, such is the "settled" approach
established by Sibbach and followed "for nearly seven decades," 123 and
Justice Scalia sees no "special justification" for overruling the
124
precedent.
Justice Scalia provides two justifications for his interpretation of
Sibbach. The first comes at the end of Part II-B, where he references
what he sees as the key passage from Sibbach:
A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and
invalid in others-or valid in some cases and invalid in othersdepending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a state substantive
law (or a state procedural law enacted for substantive purposes).
That could not be clearer in Sibbach:
"The petitioner says the phrase ['substantive rights' in the
Rules Enabling Act] connotes more; that by its use Congress
intended that in regulating procedure this Court should not
deal with important and substantial rights theretofore recognized. Recognized where and by whom? The state courts are
divided as to the power in the absence of statute to order a
physical examination. In a number such an order is authorized
by statute or rule ..
"
"The asserted right, moreover, is no more important than
many others enjoyed by litigants in District Courts sitting in the
several states before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
altered and abolished old rights or privileges and created new
ones in connection with the conduct of litigation. .

.

. If we

were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the
alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion
worse confounded. The test must be whether a rule really reg"125
ulates procedure ...
The principle Justice Scalia derives from the above quoted passage is that the validity of a Federal Rule does not depend on whether
"its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law." 126 But the quoted
material says no such thing. As we know, Sibbach conceded that the
right at issue-the right of a litigant to be free from a court-ordered
physical examination-was a procedural right, and the Sibbach Court
122 Id. at 1445-46.
123 Id. at 1446.
124 See id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
125 Id. at 1444 (alterations in original) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1941)).
126 See id.
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emphasized its agreement with that concession at several points in its
opinion. 127 Sibbach attempted to maneuver around this concession
by arguing that that § 2072(b) should be extended to cover "important" or "substantial" rights, including the procedural right she
asserted.1 28 This was the precise argument being addressed and
rejected in the above quoted passage. The "really regulates procedure" language, on which Justice Scalia places so much weight, operates as a tag to that rejection and is followed by the Court's
observation "[t]hat the rules in question are [procedural] is admitted."1 29 Thus, it was completely unnecessary for the Court to elaborate on the scope of § 2072(b) or to determine whether Rule 35
frustrated (or abridged, enlarged, or modified) any state substantive
130

law.

Justice Scalia's second defense of his Sibbach interpretation occurs
in footnote 9, which appears in Part II-C of his opinion. Quoted in
full, that footnote provides:
The concurrence claims that in Sibbach "[t]he Court... had no
occasion to consider whether the particular application of the Federal Rules in question would offend the Enabling Act." Had Sibbach
been applying the concurrence's theory, that is quite true-which
demonstrates how inconsistent that theory is with Sibbach. For conformity with the Rules Enabling Act was the very issue Sibbach
decided: The petitioner's position was that Rules 35 and 37
exceeded the Enabling Act's authorization; the Court faced and
rejected that argument, and proceeded to reverse the lower court
for failing to apply Rule 37 correctly. There could not be a clearer
rejection of the theory that the concurrence now advocates.
The concurrence responds that the "the specific question of
'the obligation of federal courts to apply the substantive law of a
state'" was not before the Court. It is clear from the context, however, that this passage referred to the Erie prohibition of court-created rules that displace state law. The opinion unquestionably dealt
with the Federal Rules' compliance with § 2072(b), and it adopted
the standard we apply here to resolve the question, which does not
depend on whether individual applications of the Rule abridge or
127 See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10-11, 14.
128 See id. at 11.
129 Id. at 14.
130 Commentators have suggested that the really-regulates-procedure test "is no
test at all-in a sense, it is little more than the statement that a matter is procedural if,
by revelation, it is procedural." 19 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER &
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509, at 264 (2d ed. 1996).
And, in Sibbach, that "revelation" was, in large part, a product of the plaintiffs strategic concession. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 11.
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modify state-law rights. To the extent Sibbach did not address the
Federal Rules' validity vis-A-vis contrary state law, Hanna surely did,
13 1
and it made clear that Sibbach's test still controls.
The first paragraph of footnote 9 is constructed on a rather obvious misinterpretation of the Stevens concurrence. The language Justice Scalia quotes from the concurrence comes from a passage in
which Justice Stevens asserts that Sibbach involved a facial challenge to
Rule 35 and not an as-applied challenge. 32 (The full passage from
13 3
) Juswhich the Stevens quote is taken makes that abundantly clear.

tice Scalia's response to Justice Stevens's assertion is that "conformity
with the Rules Enabling Act was the very issue Sibbach decided," suggesting that Stevens was making a completely different and obviously
incorrect point, namely, that conformity with the Enabling Act was
not at issue in Sibbach.13 4 Of course, Stevens made no such argument
and Justice Scalia's dismantling of this never-made argument proves
nothing about the position Stevens actually took or whether the Sib13 5
bach Court clearly rejected the theory of the concurrence.
The second paragraph of footnote 9 responds to Justice Stevens's
contention that no issue of state substantive law was at issue in Sibbach.13 6 Justice Scalia responds with a non-sequitur that morphs into a
conclusion: "The opinion [in Sibbach] unquestionably dealt with the
Federal Rules' compliance with § 2072(b), and it adopted the standard we apply here to resolve the question, which does not depend on
whether individual applications of the Rule abridge or modify statelaw rights."'13 7 Of course, the fact that Sibbach dealt with "compliance
with § 2072(b)" 138 does not contradict Justice Stevens's obviously cor13 9
rect assertion that state substantive law was not at issue in Sibbach.
The latter part of Justice Scalia's response simply describes the standard he says he must apply.
The footnote concludes with the observation that if "Sibbach did
not address the Federal Rules' validity vis-a-vis contrary state law,
131 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 n.9 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original)
(citations omitted).
132 See id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
133 See id. at 1454 & nn.l1-12.
134 Id. at 1445 n.9 (plurality opinion).
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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Hanna surely did."1 40 But, yet again, the Stevens concurrence is misconstrued. The question for Stevens was not whether Sibbach
14
addressed the validity of a federal rule vis-A-vis "contrary state law," '
but whether it did so vis-A-vis contrary state substantive law.' 4 2 Justice
Stevens says Sibbach did not do the latter, and Justice Scalia never actu-

ally refutes that point. And, of course, Hanna v.

14 3

Plumer

did not

involve a conflict between a Federal Rule and contrary state substan144
tive law.

B. Justice Stevens's Rejection of the Sibbach Mandate
In Justice Stevens's view, "the plurality [has] misread[ ]" Sibbach.14 5 Unlike the plurality, Justice Stevens found no Sibbach mandate against as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules. His
interpretation of Sibbach was premised on what he perceived as two
critical points in the Sibbach decision. First, "[t]he petitioner [in Sibbach] raised only the facial question whether 'Rules 35 and 37 [of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are ...within the mandate of Congress to this court.' 1 46 Second, "the specific question of 'the obligation of federal courts to apply the substantive law of a state"' was not
at issue in Sibbach.147 Putting these two points together, Justice Stevens concludes, "The [Sibbach] Court, therefore, had no occasion to
consider whether the particular application of the Federal Rules in
question would offend the Enabling Act."' 148 He explained further:
Nor, in Sibbach, was any further analysis necessary to the resolution of the case because the matter at issue, requiring medical
exams for litigants, did not pertain to "substantive rights" under the
Enabling Act. Although most state rules bearing on the litigation
process are adopted for some policy reason, few seemingly "procedural" rules define the scope of a substantive right or remedy. The
matter at issue in Sibbach reflected competing federal and state judgments about privacy interests. Those privacy concerns may have
been weighty and in some sense substantive; but they did not per140 Id. at 1445 n.9 (plurality opinion).
141 See id.
142 See id. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
143 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
144 See id. at 461-62 (addressing a conflict between federal and state service of
process provisions).
145 See Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
146 Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941)).

147
148

Id.
Id.
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tain to the scope of any state right or remedy at issue in the litigation. Thus, in response to the petitioner's argument in Sibbach that
"substantive rights" include not only "rights sought to be adjudicated by the litigants" but also "general principle[s]" or "question [s] of public policy that the legislature is able to pass upon," we
held that "the phrase 'substantive rights"' embraces only state
rights, such as the tort law in that case, that are sought to be
149
enforced in the judicial proceedings.
Justice Stevens also offered a response to Justice Scalia's suggestion that Hanna adopted a no-as-applied-challenges approach to the
REA:
Although this Court's decision in Hannacited Sibbach, that is of little significance. Hanna did not hold that any seemingly procedural
federal rule will always govern, even when it alters a substantive state
right; nor, as in Sibbach, was the argument that I now make before
the Court. Indeed, in Hanna we cited Sibbach's statement that the
Enabling Act prohibits federal rules that alter the rights to be adjudicated by the litigants, for the proposition that "a court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling
Act ...need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule
makes the character and result of the federal litigation stray from
15 0
the course it would follow in state courts."
C. Justice Stevens Is Correct
The fact thatJustice Scalia did not mount an effective defense for
his interpretation of Sibbach does not mean that he was wrong. Perhaps there is a better argument. For example, if one reads the phrase
"really regulates procedure"'1 51 in isolation, one can certainly construct an argument that Sibbach melded the two requirements of the
REA into a single standard-one that focuses entirely on the procedural character of the Federal Rule. Some commentators have read Sibbach in this fashion, but more as a critique of the opinion than as a
celebration. 15 2 Moreover, even these commentators have tended to
assume a worst-case-scenario interpretation of Sibbach by focusing
more on the isolated phrase than they do on the critical details of the
149 Id. at 1455 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S.
at 2-3, 13-14).
150 Id. at 1455 n.14 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965)).
151 Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
152 See, e.g., 19 WIGTrr, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 130, at 260-66; John Hart
Ely, The IrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. RE-'. 693, 718-20, 733-34 (1974).
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case. 153 In any event, I have seven difficulties with the Scalia (or worstcase) interpretation of Sibbach. I will state each briefly.
First, the text of § 2072(b), in plain and understandable terms,
imposes a substantive-rights limit on the scope of the REA delegation
to the Supreme Court: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 154 This textual limit does not distinguish
between facial and as-applied challenges, and it does not purport to
create a redundancy with § 2072 (a), which itself vests the Court with
"the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure."' 155
When reading the text of § 2072(a) and (b) together, one does not
need an interpretive guide. The words are clear and speak for themselves. Hence, the explication of § 2072(b) should start and end with
15 6
the text.
Second, if we must look to precedent to discover the meaning of
§ 2072(b), we should begin with the proposition that all judicial decisions are contextual and that the language used in any judicial decision must be read and understood contextually. I quite agree with
Justice Harlan's observation that "shorthand formulations which have
appeared in some past decisions are prone to carry untoward results
that frequently arise from oversimplification." 15 7 So, while one could
ride the phrase "really regulates procedure" down a trail that eviscerates or substantially curtails the text of § 2072(b), I would not take
that option unless the factual and legal context that gave life to the
phrase made the countertextual choice clear and inevitable. Typically, as was true in Justice Scalia's opinion, the choice to ride the
really-regulates-procedure trail is premised largely, if not completely,
158
on an acontextual reading of the operative phrase.
Third, the context in which "really regulates procedure" first
appears in the Sibbach opinion includes these critical factors: 1) the
challenge in Sibbach to Rule 35 was facial, not as applied; 159 2) Sibbach
153 See Ely, supra note 152, at 719.
154 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
155 See id. § 2072(a).
156 Even Justice Scalia agrees that his interpretation of Sibbach "is hard to square
with § 2072(b)'s terms." Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446.
157 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
158 The highly regarded Professor Ely describes Sibbach's § 2072(b) argument
somewhat inaccurately as premised on an assertion that "the right not to be subjected

to the sort of physical examination contemplated by Rule 35 was one recognized as
substantive." Ely, supra note 152, at 733. Technically this is correct, but only to the
extent that one understands the phrase "substantive" to include all fights, including
procedural rights, deemed "important" or "substantial." Ely does not appear to be
using the word in that limited fashion.
159

See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11 (1941).
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conceded that the right at issue was procedural, 160 thus simultaneously satisfying § 2072(a) and eliminating any potential application of
§ 2072(b); 3) the phrase appears in a section of the opinion that
rejects Sibbach's effort to extend the § 2072(b) proscription to otherwise non-substantive rights that are deemed "important" or "substantial"; 16 1 and, 4) the phrase, both in itself and when read within the
passage in which it appears, provides, at best, a cryptic and elliptical
way of announcing a rather bold and superfluous interpretation of
§ 2072(b). With the combination of these factors, it is difficult, at the
very least, to read the phrase "really regulates procedure" as proclaiming the irrelevance of state law and eliminating all as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules. 162 Of course, this conclusion is in accord
163
with Justice Stevens's concurrence in Shady Grove.
Fourth, despite the fact that Sibbach has been on the books for
almost seven decades, the Supreme Court has never actually applied
or even expressly endorsed the interpretation urged by Justice
Scalia. 164 The Court's occasional references to Sibbach are not to the
contrary. In Hanna, for example, the Court referenced the really-regulates-procedure formula, but had no occasion to consider whether
the rule at issue before it abridged, enlarged, or modified a substantive right, because the right invoked in Hanna was a classically proce165
dural right-specifically, the right to a particular method of service.
Indeed, the Court in Hanna arguably invited the possibility of asapplied challenges to the Federal Rules when it observed, "a court, in
measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the
degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the fed166
eral litigation stray from the course it would follow in state courts."
Similarly suggestive of an as-applied endorsement is the Hanna
Court's favorable quotation of Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mur160

See id.

161 See id. at 13-14.
162 See supra Part III.
163 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.Ct. 1431,
1452-55 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

164 Professor Struve's careful analysis of the relevant precedent establishes that the
as-applied model is, in fact, firmly rooted in the Court's jurisprudence. Catherine T.
Struve, InstitutionalPractice, ProceduralUniformitiy, and As-Applied Challenges Under the
Rules EnablingAct, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1190-1203 (2011).
165 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
166 Id.at 473. Justice Scalia describes the quoted passage from Hannaas "obscure
obiter dictum," Shady Grove, 130 S.Ct. at 1446 n.12 (plurality opinion), providing an
interesting contrast with his generous reading of Sibbach.
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phree,167 where the latter Court explained that Rule 4(f) "does not
operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which
168
that court will adjudicate its rights."

In fact, not only has the Court never endorsed Justice Scalia's noas-applied-challenges interpretation of § 2072(b), the unanimous
Court seems to have endorsed opposite view in Semtek InternationalInc.
v. Lockheed Martin Cop.,169 where the Court observed that an interpretation of Rule 41 (b) that would extinguish a state-recognized right to
sue "would seem to violate" § 2072(b). 170 The Semtek opinion was,
oddly enough, written by Justice Scalia.
Fifth, § 2072(b) is a congressional mandate that expressly limits
the scope of the congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to
the Supreme Court. 17 1 A reading of Sibbach that would eviscerate or
substantially curtail that limitation places the judiciary in the position
of enhancing its own power in the face of a congressionally imposed
mandate to the contrary. Given this potential aggrandizement of
power, circumspection in one's interpretation of Sibbach and
§ 2072(b) would seem to be a virtue.
Sixth, the narrowed construction of § 2072(b) endorsed by Justice Scalia undervalues a principle of federalism that arises when, in a
diversity case, the conflicting law is both state-created and substantive.
Finally, if Sibbach did, in fact, adopt a narrow construction of
§ 2072(b), the opinion should be disavowed.17 2 I do not say "overruled" because the rule of Sibbach can be no broader than the case
itself, and, as I have explained, Sibbach had nothing to do with asapplied challenges to the Federal Rules or to a Federal Rule said to
abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive right (as opposed to an
"important" or "substantial" right). In short, ignore the dicta and
apply the narrow and specific rule that emerges from the Sibbach
decision.
Thus, if the question is one of statutory construction or of stare
decisis, Justice Stevens was plainly correct.

167
168
169
170

326 U.S. 438 (1946).
Hanna,380 U.S. at 465 (quoting Murphree, 326 U.S. at 446) (emphasis added).
531 U.S. 497 (2001).
Id. at 504; see Struve, supra note 164, at 1201.

171

See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).

172 See 19

WRGirr, MILLER

152, 718-20, 733-34.

& COOPER, supra note 130, at 260-66; Ely, supra note
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THE POLICY QUESTIONS

Justice Scalia asserts two policy reasons in support of his interpretation of the REA. First, by allowing as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules, the Stevens interpretation would lead to "chaos," with the
Federal Rules varying from state to state.173 Second, the Stevens interpretation requires a significantly more complicated inquiry than the
174
approach endorsed by the plurality.
The first point is difficult to credit other than as a rhetorical
flourish, for despite Justice Scalia's insistence that Sibbach eliminated
all as-applied challenges to the Federal Rules, lower federal courts
have adhered to the text of § 2072(b) and, in so doing, have considered as-applied challenges to various Federal Rules, the vast majority
of which fail under the strong presumption of validity accorded those
rules. 175 As Justice Stevens points out, "the bar for finding an Enabling Act problem is a high one."' 76 Thus, "[i]t will be rare that a
federal rule that is facially valid under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 will displace a
State's definition of its own substantive rights."'1 77 The occasional
state law trumping of a Federal Rule under this high bar certainly
does not amount to anything like chaos.
With respect to Justice Scalia's second point-ease of applica-

tion-he is correct in his observation, but not on the consequences of
it. As to the observation, if only facial challenges are permitted under
§ 2072(b), the inquiry will be brightline-no as-applied challengesand easily applied since the entire analysis will focus on the text of the
Federal Rule, asking only whether the rule itself abridges, enlarges, or
modifies a substantive right. Moreover, as Justice Scalia points out,
the "abridge" and "modify" limitations become wholly inoperative
under this model, for the Sibbach mandate under which state law is
irrelevant renders their application virtually impossible. 178 So, in fact,
the only § 2072(b) question is whether the Federal Rule itself creates
173 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1446 (2010) (plurality opinion).
174 See id. at 1447 & nn.14-15.
175 See 17AJAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTrICE § 124.05 (3d ed.
2010) (citing cases applying § 2072(b)); 19 WRIGrr, MILLER & COOPER, supra note

130, at 273-92 (same) .
176 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
177 Id. at 1454 n.10; see MooRE ET AL., supra note 175, § 124.05 (noting the rarity
of successful challenges under § 2072(b)); 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note

130, at 271-72 (examining the strong presumption of validity accorded the Federal
Rules, but noting potential that § 2072(b) might be transgressed in "unusual cases").
178 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1446 (plurality opinion).
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a substantive right. The added bonus here is that it is unlikely that
any substantive-right-creating rule would survive the rulemaking process. Thus, the Scalia standard would be both easy to apply and rarely,
if ever, invoked. The Stevens model, on the other hand, requires a
somewhat complicated inquiry (as evidenced by Justice Stevens's own
application of that model), 179 and can be expected to be more than
occasionally invoked, though rarely with success. Thus, if ease of
application were the only concern, the nod would go to Justice Scalia.
There are two problems with the ease-of-application policy argument. The first is effectively addressed by Justice Stevens:
[The] inquiry is what the Enabling Act requires: While it may not be
easy to decide what is actually a "substantive right," "the designations substantive and procedural become important, for the Enabling Act has made them so." The question, therefore, is not what
rule we think would be easiest on federal courts. The question is
what rule Congress established. Although, Justice Scalia may generally prefer easily administrable, bright-line rules, his preference
does not give us license to adopt a second-best interpretation of the
Rules Enabling Act. Courts cannot ignore text and context in the
180
service of simplicity.
Of course, if you agree with Justice Scalia's interpretation of Sibbach, you might say that the bright-line rule adopted by him was a
product of precedent and not of his interpretive choice. Quite obviously, for the reasons outlined in Part IV, I think it was more like the
latter.
There is a second objection to the ease-of-application policy.
While federal procedure should be no more complicated than necessary to promote the fair and efficient delivery of justice in a manner
consistent with legitimate federal policy concerns, it does not follow
that federal procedure should always be simple.
Consider this analogy. In the context of statutory federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331), there are two tests for measuring
whether the statute has been satisfied. One of those tests is relatively
simple to apply, the other less so. The simple test-the "creation
test"-asks whether federal law creates the plaintiffs claim or cause of
action. 18 1 If so, the case "arises under" federal law and thereby satisfies the standards of § 1331.182 If this were the exclusive test for mea179 See id. at 1454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
180 Id. at 1454 (citations omitted) (quoting Ely, supra note 152, at 723).
181 See, e.g., Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.").

182

See id.
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suring jurisdiction under § 1331, the determination of federal
question jurisdiction would always be simple indeed. But there is, in
addition to the creation test, a not-so-simple test. Under this test-the
"essential federal ingredient test"-a claim or cause of action not created by federal law might nonetheless "arise under" federal law for
purposes of jurisdiction if that claim or cause of action includes an
essential federal ingredient. 18 3 This test is complicated and rarely
serves as a basis for establishing jurisdiction. Some have, therefore,
called for its elimination.' 8 4 Yet, the test persists because, although it
is relatively complicated and rarely invoked with success, it offers a
jurisdictional safety valve for those cases that do not satisfy the creation test but for which the availability of a federal forum advances significant federal policy concerns.
The same can be said of the not-so-easy-to-apply approach to
§ 2072(b) endorsed by Justice Stevens. The uniformity of the Federal
Rules is an important value, and a simplified approach to measuring
the validity of those rules surely advances that value, but not without
costs. In the context of diversity cases, a strict application of the uniformity value, which occurs under Justice Scalia's model, and which
renders state substantive law irrelevant, fails to account for the prerogatives and nuances of state law, both of which reflect important federal policy concerns. The strict uniformity model also assumes that
the drafters of the Federal Rules possess a type of omniscience or prescience that enables them to account for all present and future variances in the modeling of state substantive law. By way of contrast, the
added complexity-and it is not that complex-generated by enforcing § 2072 (b) according to its text provides a limited but useful safety
valve in service of legitimate federal policy interests (i.e., federalism
and separation of powers) that may occasionally conflict with and
override the uniformity principle.
CONCLUSION

The practical distinction between the interpretive models
endorsed by Justices Scalia and Stevens is of limited consequence.
Under both, it is unlikely that a Federal Rule will ever be invalidated
on its face, and even under the Stevens model, very few Federal Rules
will ever be limited in application by virtue of § 2072(b). So why care?
In part, I care because those "very few" limited-in-application
instances are nonetheless significant to the extent that they accommo183

See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312

(2005).
184

See id. at 320-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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date the Federal Rules to what should be the controlling principles of
state substantive law. Even more importantly, however, I think that
texts ought to matter, and that the interpretation of a text should not
be a freewheeling exercise in judicial creativity and policymaking.
The text of § 2072(b) matters; the text of the Court's opinion in Sibbach matters. Justice Scalia's approach to both feels like jagged fingernails scraping across the jurisprudential chalkboard. That is not a
good thing.
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